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1、China Coming over the horizon Why China wants a bigger navy Jan 4th 2007?|?Beijing?|From the print edition CHINA'S President Hu Jintao is seldom seen wearing military green. So when he does, the armed forces pay attention. America and countries around Asia also had cause to sit up and take notic

2、e when Mr Hu appeared in military attire on December 27th to declare that China had to build a powerful navy and “make sound preparations for military struggles”. The official summary of Mr Hu's remarks to a gathering of delegates to a congress of the navy's Communist Party branch provided little d

3、etail of what the president had in mind. But the tone of his remarks, his insistence that China was a maritime power and the prominence given by the official media to the speech all seem to point to China's determination to build a blue-water navy able to reach far beyond its shores. America has lo

4、ng fretted that China plans to project its power, not least in order to provide security for its rapidly growing imports of oil and other commodities shipped from the Middle East and Africa. A Pentagon report last year said China could maintain only a “symbolic” naval presence beyond its coast, but

5、was interested in extending its presence to the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean. For more than eight years—partly in an effort to placate America—China has published occasional white papers outlining its military posture. But the latest, published two days after Mr Hu's speech, does little to c

6、ast light on China's intentions. It does not mention, for example, that China is developing an aircraft carrier, as the Pentagon suspects. Nor does the white paper discuss any of China's considerable purchases of advanced weaponry from Russia in recent years, mainly for its navy and air force. This

7、 includes destroyers, submarines, sea-skimming anti-ship missiles and fighter jets. Quite how this spending spree conforms with the document's assertion that China's security environment “remains sound” is not explained. Among the “security challenges” that China does spell out is Taiwan's “radical

8、 policy” of pursuing formal independence from China, which it says threatens stability across the Asia-Pacific region (Taiwan admits to no such aim, even though its leaders are sympathetic to it). Still, despite its military build-up, including the deployment of hundreds of missiles on the coast fac

9、ing Taiwan, China has muted its bellicosity. Its previous defence white paper in 2004 threatened to crush “resolutely and thoroughly” any major move towards independence by Taiwan, “at any cost”. That threat is not repeated. Mr Hu appears far more confident now than he did two years ago that Taiwan

10、's President Chen Shui-bian lacks the political strength and daring necessary to sever the island's constitutional links with the mainland. Mr Chen has openly toyed with the idea of constitutional change. But America's warnings against it (for fear of being dragged into a war with China) and a lack

11、of public appetite for confrontation appear to be restraining him. In a speech on January 1st, Mr Chen spoke of the “myth” of one China and said only the people of Taiwan had the right to decide their future. But he did not set out any plans to rewrite the constitution accordingly. The following da

12、y Mr Hu said China would “not compromise on Taiwan independence”. He also said that it would never give up its efforts to reunify the country peacefully. There is likely to be turbulence in Taiwanese politics as it prepares for parliamentary elections at the end of this year and presidential polls e

13、arly in 2008, but Mr Hu is staying calm. Even Mr Chen, who normally worries that the island's increasingly close economic ties with China might compromise its security, has relaxed a little. On December 29th Taiwan announced the easing of its restriction on technology used by Taiwanese semiconducto

14、r manufacturers operating in China. It is not a big gesture. The more advanced process permitted under the new rule is already being used by Chinese competitors, Taiwanese officials say. For all the suspicions between China and America, the last year has seen a continuing thaw in their military rel

15、ationship. This was all but frozen in 2001 after a collision between a Chinese fighter and an American spy-plane. But in July General Guo Boxiong, China's most senior officer, paid the highest-level visit to America by a Chinese serviceman since that incident. Moreover the American and Chinese navie

16、s, including destroyers and aircraft, staged their first ever joint search-and-rescue manoeuvres in September off Hawaii and in November in the South China Sea. American officials brushed off an incident in October when a Chinese submarine, apparently unexpectedly, surfaced close to an American airc

17、raft carrier near the Japanese island of Okinawa. So why is Mr Hu, who has been commander-in-chief since 2004, so keen on a bigger navy? Prestige could well be part of it. Chinese state-run television aired (twice, in November and December) an unusual documentary series called “The Rise of Great Na

18、tions”. It described, with a remarkable lack of the usual anti-Western tone, how Japan and various Western countries including America and Britain became strong. Naval power was a vital ingredient, the programmes suggested. A recent report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argued that since

19、 China's rapid economic growth in the past three decades had been concentrated in coastal areas, China now had long-range maritime interests. As a result, the country was in the process of changing from a continental land power into a sea power. Expect to see more of that green outfit. From the pri

20、nt edition: Asia Chinese foreign policy A quintet, anyone? China is making it clear that it wants a bigger role in the Middle East Jan 11th 2007?|?Beijing?|From the print edition UNLIKE other outside powers involved in the Middle East, China is on good terms with everyone. Hardly had Ir

21、an's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, left Beijing than Israel's prime minister, Ehud Olmert (above with Wen Jiabao, his Chinese counterpart), arrived this week for talks with Chinese leaders. Should America be worrying? Last month, the Chinese foreign ministry played host to what it called

22、its first non-governmental seminar bringing together former senior Israeli and Palestinian officials to discuss ways of achieving peace. They reached a consensus that must have pleased their hosts. China, they said in a statement, should increase its influence in the Middle East and join the “Quarte

23、t” (America, the European Union, the?UN?and Russia) that is pursuing peace efforts. This, China's press quoted a Palestinian participant as saying, would help counter the bias of “some countries” involved. Never mind that China, in the more than four years since it appointed a special envoy to the

24、Middle East, has offered no original ideas. To all sides, it still has much to offer. To oil-exporting countries, China has rapidly emerged since the 1990s as a big customer and investor. Some 45% of China's oil imports from January to November last year were from the Middle East. To countries such

25、as Iran and Syria, eager to check American power in the region, China's veto power at the?UN?and its shared misgivings about America make it a welcome friend. Refreshingly, China asks no questions about democracy. Israel, too, courts China because of its potential influence in the region. China sha

26、res its distaste for Islamic militancy. And despite China's close ties with Arab countries and Iran, Israel (to America's chagrin) sees China as an important market for its military industries. Last week China unveiled a new home-built advanced fighter jet, the?Jian-10. Western military experts beli

27、eve it incorporates Israeli (as well as Russian) technology. American officials do worry. China has been hesitant to put pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear programme. In the first 11 months of last year, Iran was China's third-biggest supplier of oil after Angola and Saudi Arabia, providing 12

28、% of the total. China has also been reluctant to penalise Arab-led Sudan for the bloodshed in Darfur. From January to November 2006, Sudan accounted for less than 3% of China's crude imports. But China has invested hugely in Sudan's oil infrastructure, helping it become a net oil exporter. China se

29、es advantages for itself in any diminution of American power. In its view, America's preoccupation with the insurgency in Iraq strengthens China's hand in its dealings with Taiwan. Anxious to avoid trouble on another front, America has been even more vigorous than usual in deterring Taiwan from ange

30、ring China with any hint of a move towards formal independence. In both Sudan and Iran, China has often balked at American-led initiatives in the?UN?that could be seen as legitimising strong-arm tactics against countries deviating from international norms. China fears it might be next. But China ha

31、s recently edged closer to America's position. In November, its?UNambassador, Wang Guangya, began showing unusual zeal in trying to persuade Sudan to accept?UN?intervention in Darfur. The same month, China offered to send 1,000 troops to join?UN?peacekeepers in Lebanon. On December 23rd China and ot

32、her members of the?UNSecurity Council approved the imposition of sanctions on Iran's trade in nuclear and missile-related materials. The sanctions were hardly crippling, but China's endorsement of them was an important symbolic act. Despite China's disdain for the American-led invasions of Iraq and

33、 Afghanistan (the latter bringing the American army right to China's border), it has not attempted to frustrate American operations in either country. It has pledged more than $300m for reconstruction in Afghanistan and begun negotiations with Iraq that could result in its writing off billions of do

34、llars-worth of pre-invasion Iraqi debt. China was a big seller of arms to both Iraq and Iran during the 1980s war between the two countries. It hawked missiles and nuclear technology across the region. But since the 1990s it has been far more sympathetic to American concerns about weapons proliferat

35、ion and has tightened its still-imperfect export controls. China worries about its dependence on American military might for the security of its oil shipments from the Middle East. It is still a long way from being able to project military power over such a distance itself, though a Chinese officia

36、l was quoted in the state-owned press this week as saying China had the ability to build an aircraft carrier, but had not decided when to do so. China is trying to diversify its sources of energy, buying more from Russia, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America. But experts predict that China will l

37、ong remain heavily dependent on energy from the Middle East. So it has little choice but to support efforts to stabilise the region. It may not agree with America's tactics, but will share the same broad objective. Jeffrey Bader, a former senior American diplomat now at the Brookings Institution, a

38、think-tank in Washington,?DC, says that China's resistance to American initiatives in Sudan and Iran depends on Russian support for its position. If Russia were to switch sides, so too would China, he argues. It is in no mood to take on America alone. From the print edition: Asia Chinese acc

39、ounting Cultural revolution New accounting rules have replaced the Little Red Book as China's guide to self-improvement. Can the state handle the truth? Jan 11th 2007?|?hong kong?|From the print edition SEPARATING truth from propaganda in China has always been hard, not least when it comes to

40、numbers. Accountants, of all people, were seen as such a threat that during the 1960s they were packed off to re-education camps, dooming the profession for decades afterward. Even in kindlier times, businesses reported information that would interest a centrally planned economy, such as production

41、quotas. The measuring sticks of bourgeois managers—costs, debt, depreciation, and (of course) profit—were ignored. But since the 1990s China has begun scrubbing up its accounting system. At the beginning of this year it made its biggest move yet when the Ministry of Finance required the 1,200 compa

42、nies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stockmarkets to adopt, with important exceptions, norms similar to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These standards may sound like instruments of accounting torture, but countries all over the world are embracing them. China has given all i

43、ts other firms the option of complying with them “voluntarily”—a word with many shades of meaning. If the changes are more than just cynical window-dressing designed to attract foreign investment, they will mark a profound shift in what China wants people to know not only about its companies, but al

44、so about its economy and its government. A new accounting system would certainly help China. Most companies are good at keeping tabs on their operations, but the book-keeping is complicated by use of a thick manual that makes bewildering distinctions between different kinds of provisions. The resul

45、t is a mess. “The records are complete, the question is how do you make sense of them,” says T.J. Wong, a professor of accounting at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Murder by numbers There is abundant evidence, from trade statistics to fumes spewing out of factories and power plants across th

46、e country, that the Chinese economy is doing well. But how well individual companies are doing is far harder to tell. The financial results of companies that global investors wish to buy into can be as unintelligible as the dialect spoken in the company town. It is said (with apparent sincerity) tha

47、t some Chinese firms keep several sets of books—one for the government, one for company records, one for foreigners and one to report what is actually going on. Under the new approach, accounts will be prepared under 39 principle-based standards structured to reveal the economic value of a firm, wi

48、th the aim of using market prices wherever possible. A clear understanding of a firm's revenues, costs and debt would enhance the efficiency of China's companies—the avowed goal—as well as making it easier to attract foreign capital and to invest abroad. More profoundly, by properly reflecting cost

49、s, the heavy burden of state control would become more evident, as would the pricing signals that indicate the real desires of the Chinese people. Sleazy transfers of mispriced assets from the state to the private sector would become vastly more difficult. Theoretically, accounting would serve as a

50、force for democracy. Given all these benefits, the decision to shift accounting standards was, says one informed observer, not unlike the one to host the Olympics. It emanated from the top of the Beijing government and was aimed at bringing China into line with the rest of the world. Accounting, ho

51、wever, makes Olympiads look easy. All China must pull off to host the games is to renovate bits of its big cities. By contrast, international accounting standards are built on foundations that China does not possess, such as experience of truthful record-keeping and deep, clean, markets so that “fa

52、ir” valuations can be placed on financial instruments, property and softer assets like brands and intellectual property. (These in turn rely on enforceable laws.) What market exists that could put a fair price on the clumps of freshly built office blocks that stand empty in cities across China, asks

53、 Gary Biddle, a professor of accounting at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. The decision to adopt international accounting standards was made in November 2005, to be put into effect in little more than a year. The announcement generated praise (for its worthy intentions) and shoc

54、k (for its ambition). America, despite having the world's deepest financial markets, is concerned about using market-based “fair-value” reporting and will only partially converge with international standards by the end of 2008, if then. Thailand and South Korea have yet to pledge convergence of thei

55、r own systems with?IFRS, despite having many years' more experience than China with market-based accounting systems. Beansprout counters To witness the scale of the work ahead, you need only look at the upheavals in a mainland firm when it lists its shares in Hong Kong, and must therefore bring

56、its accounts up to international standards. In a developed market, the number-crunching ahead of a listing takes months. In China, it can take up to three years. And these are typically the best Chinese companies, able to afford the best advisors. Certain conditions, such as “related-party” transac

57、tions, are almost impossible to bring into line with international standards, so they will be fudged. Under international accounting norms, deals between companies with overlapping ownership are supposed to be clearly disclosed. This is a sound principle in general and particularly appropriate for c

58、ompanies in countries where the government owns a piece of almost everything, and presses companies to take steps that may be bad for them (such as buying from troubled suppliers to protect jobs). But because overlapping ownership is so common in China (the government still owns shares in almost ev

59、ery large company), detailing each transaction would overwhelm a financial report. For “pure state-controlled enterprises” there will be no disclosure requirement. An equally large problem is the lack of accountants to process the raw numbers. In no other place in the world, and probably at no othe

60、r time in history, have accountants been so sought-after as they are in China. By even the most generous reckoning, the country has fewer than 70,000 practising accountants, trying to do the work of anything from 300,000 to a million bean counters. To be an accounting student at a reputable school i

61、s to have a good job waiting. But even after several years of education, accountants require an apprenticeship, especially if they are to get to grips with international standards based on intellectually demanding principles rather prescriptive rules. Accountants in Britain, acknowledging the diffic

62、ulties, are helping with the training. Hong Kong and China are also hosting seminars where the new standards are presented to crowds of eager accountants; but the long lectures do not provide anything like enough of a guide to a person preparing, or auditing, a firm's books. It is said that Chinese

63、 officials have put pressure on many outsiders helping introduce the new regime to say that convergence has already taken place; that has clearly frightened many, and muffled criticism. Silence, though, would be costly, says Martin Fahy, director of development for the Asia-Pacific region at the Ch

64、artered Institute of Management Accounts. “You can't have a functioning financial market and economy without objective and independent accounting. This is a test for not only China, but for the integrity of the accounting profession as well.” To gauge accountants' understanding of the changes to fi

65、nancial reporting in China, a manager at a large investment-fund company has asked a string of accounting firms whether earnings will rise or fall or at least better reflect businesses' performance. It is hard to imagine a simpler test. No one had an answer. From the print edition: Finance and econ

66、omics [2007.01.16]Hong Kong and Shanghai Duel for Financial Capital Hong Kong and Shanghai Duel for Financial Capital? By?KEITH BRADSHER?and?DAVID BARBOZA Published: January 16, 2007 HONG KONG, Jan. 15 — Hong Kong and Shanghai are locked in an increasingly public struggle to become China’s main financial center as a top-level committee in the capital, Beijing, prepares to meet later this month to map out a national financial regulatory strategy. On Monday, Hong Kong’s highest gov