股權(quán)激勵機制在我國企業(yè)中的運用研究
股權(quán)激勵機制在我國企業(yè)中的運用研究,股權(quán),激勵機制,我國,企業(yè),中的,運用,應(yīng)用,研究,鉆研
三 江 學(xué) 院
畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文）任務(wù)書
高 職 院（系）
財務(wù)管理 專業(yè)
論文題目 股權(quán)激勵機制在我國企業(yè)中的運用研究
學(xué)生姓名 單敏芳 學(xué)號 B125023053
起訖日期 2015.12.08~2016.4.09
指導(dǎo)教師姓名（簽名） 徐洪燦
指導(dǎo)教師職稱 副教授
指導(dǎo)教師工作單位 三江學(xué)院
院（系）領(lǐng)導(dǎo)簽名
下發(fā)任務(wù)書日期 ： 2015年 12 月 08日
題 目
股權(quán)激勵機制在我國企業(yè)中的運用研究
論文時間
2015年12月08日～2016年4月09日
課題的主要內(nèi)容及要求(含技術(shù)要求、圖表要求等)
1、完整的畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）需要由題名（標(biāo)題）、目錄、摘要、引言（前言）、正文、結(jié)論、謝辭、參考文獻等幾部分構(gòu)成。
（1）題目：應(yīng)使用規(guī)范、簡潔、高度概括、具有學(xué)術(shù)性的語言，必要時可加副題名。
（2）摘要：應(yīng)當(dāng)概括研究課題的主要內(nèi)容、方法和觀點，以及取得的主要成果和結(jié)論，應(yīng)反映整個論文的精華。
（3）引言（前言）：應(yīng)說明本設(shè)計的目的、意義、范圍及應(yīng)達到的技術(shù)要求；簡述本類設(shè)計在國內(nèi)（外）發(fā)展概況及存在的問題；本設(shè)計的指導(dǎo)思想；闡述本設(shè)計應(yīng)解決的主要問題。
（4）正文：主體內(nèi)容包括基本概念和理論基礎(chǔ)；設(shè)計計算的主要方法和內(nèi)容；設(shè)計結(jié)果和意義的闡明；理論在實際中的應(yīng)用等，特別是對設(shè)計中遇到的重要問題要重點指出并加以研究。
（5）結(jié)論：概括說明本設(shè)計的情況和價值，分析其優(yōu)點、特色，有何創(chuàng)新，性能達到何水平，并指出研究不足和今后的改進方向。
（6）謝辭：簡述自己通過本設(shè)計的體會，并對指導(dǎo)教師和協(xié)助完成設(shè)計的有關(guān)人員表示謝意。
（7）參考文獻：在謝辭之后，應(yīng)列出主要參考文獻，并規(guī)范標(biāo)注。
2、畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）涉及圖片或者表格的，應(yīng)符合規(guī)范，圖片界面清晰，表格項目設(shè)置合理、內(nèi)容完整，并按照出現(xiàn)前后順序在圖片下方（或者表格上方）居中位置標(biāo)注序號和標(biāo)題。
3、學(xué)生應(yīng)獨立完成任務(wù)，充分發(fā)揮自己的主動性和創(chuàng)造性，實事求是，不弄虛作假，不抄襲別人的成果。
課題的實施的方法、步驟及工作量要求
1、主要工作流程：選題、下達任務(wù)書、撰寫開題報告、撰寫論文、修改并定稿、答辯、提交完整文檔資料。
（1）選題：學(xué)生應(yīng)結(jié)合實際選擇符合本專業(yè)畢業(yè)設(shè)計教學(xué)大綱基本要求的課題。
（2）開題報告：學(xué)生應(yīng)廣泛收集資料，增強選題的實用性和針對性，撰寫開題報告，擬定論文提綱，初步形成畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文）的寫作思路。
（3）初稿：學(xué)生應(yīng)根據(jù)指導(dǎo)后確定的提綱，撰寫形成畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文）初稿。
（4）定稿。學(xué)生應(yīng)在進一步參加工作實踐、深入社會調(diào)研的基礎(chǔ)上，進一步收集補充資料，根據(jù)指導(dǎo)意見對初稿進行反復(fù)多次修改，得到指導(dǎo)教師認定后方可定稿。
2、課題的工作量要求
畢業(yè)設(shè)計時間：一般不得少于8周。選題：原則上必須一人一題，一般不超過20個字。
摘要：一般在畢業(yè)論文全文完成后再寫，中文摘要約300字左右；外文摘要約250個實詞左右。論文：本科學(xué)生的正文字數(shù)不少于1萬字。
參考文獻：本科學(xué)生需要參閱10篇以上相關(guān)文獻，其中外文文獻不少于2篇。
3、畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文）全部資料、表格等必須有電子版，以紙質(zhì)和電子兩種形式在規(guī)定時間內(nèi)提交存檔。
4、課題的實施方法：學(xué)生可以采用理論研究、實踐論證、數(shù)量分析、案例建模等方法進行課題研究。學(xué)生需要通過面授、電話、網(wǎng)絡(luò)等方式主動、及時向指導(dǎo)教師匯報工作進展，與指導(dǎo)教師聯(lián)系關(guān)于開題、文獻資料查閱、方案設(shè)計、論文寫作方面的問題。
5、學(xué)生應(yīng)刻苦鉆研、勤于實踐，定期向指導(dǎo)教師匯報畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文）的工作進度、工作設(shè)想，保質(zhì)保量按時完成任務(wù)。
指 定 參
考 文 獻
[1]李明. 我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵機制與公司績效關(guān)系的實證研究[D].南京航空航天大學(xué),2012.
[2]吳征宇. 股權(quán)激勵與上市公司價值相關(guān)性研究[D].西南財經(jīng)大學(xué),2012.
[3]鄢嫣. 股權(quán)激勵在我國房地產(chǎn)上市公司中的應(yīng)用問題研究[D].華東師范大學(xué),2011.
[4]Xiaoyan Teng, Yujing HE. Study of Effects of Equity Incentive in Gem Listed Company[J]. International Business and Management, 2014, 9 (2).
畢業(yè)設(shè)計(論文)進度計劃(以周為單位)
第 1 周——第 2 周（2015年12月08日----2015年12月22日）：
在老師指導(dǎo)下選擇參考書目、完成開題報告提綱。
第 3 周——第4 周（2015年12月23日----2016年01月04日）：
修改論文開題報告
第 4 周——第 7 周（2016年01月05日----2016 年02月01日）：
完成論文初稿
第 8 周——第 10 周（2016 年02月02日----2016年02月25日）：
修改論文初稿
第 10 周——第11周（2016年02月26日----2016年3月10日）：
完成論文二稿并修改第二稿
第 12 周——第13周（2016年3月11日----2016年3月22日）：
完成論文三稿并修改第三稿
第 14周——第15周（2016年3月23日----2016年4月08日）：
論文定稿并準備答辯相關(guān)資料
三江學(xué)院畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文）開題報告
題 目
股權(quán)激勵機制在我國企業(yè)中的運用研究
學(xué)號姓名
單敏芳B125023053
指導(dǎo)教師姓名
徐洪燦
提綱(3000字以上)：
1. 對指導(dǎo)教師下達的課題任務(wù)的學(xué)習(xí)與理解；
2. 閱讀文獻資料進行調(diào)研的綜述；
3. 根據(jù)任務(wù)書的任務(wù)及文獻調(diào)研結(jié)果，初步擬定的執(zhí)行（實施）方案（含具體進度計劃）。
一、選題背景和意義
隨著全球化經(jīng)濟的不斷發(fā)展，中國經(jīng)濟也得到了迅速的發(fā)展。隨著市場經(jīng)濟和工業(yè)化進程的不斷加速，當(dāng)前的社會經(jīng)濟發(fā)展也面臨著嚴峻的壓力，并且競爭日益激烈，需要對企業(yè)制度進行改革，來提升管理的需求。
當(dāng)前社會是一個知識經(jīng)濟的時代，擁有知識就等于擁有與他人競爭的資本，所以企業(yè)競爭的最主要核心主要來自于對人力資本的積累，并且企業(yè)間的競爭也已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)化為人才的競爭。當(dāng)前對人的潛能的開發(fā)也正在如火如荼的進行，通過腦潛力的開發(fā)來為人們提供滿足目標(biāo)和達成目標(biāo)的需求，這就是企業(yè)中的激勵機制。良好的激勵機制可以為企業(yè)解決管理中的困難，受到有效激勵機制的人力資本可以為企業(yè)創(chuàng)造超出期限價值的增長。
我國的中小企業(yè)長期處于高管薪酬結(jié)合不合理的境地，缺乏薪酬與績效掛鉤的長期激勵機制，導(dǎo)致我國的高管激勵機制制度存在著一定的問題，國內(nèi)資本市場相較于其他的資本市場存在著資源不充足現(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生。目前，股權(quán)激勵機制對于我國的中小企業(yè)發(fā)揮著重要的作用，成為公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)上重要的管理形式。隨著我國市場經(jīng)濟的進一步成熟，人才競爭的重要性日益突出，成為當(dāng)前企業(yè)發(fā)展過程中不可替代的資源，并且吸引了外企的建立，使得戰(zhàn)略性人才的重要性愈發(fā)突出。所以如何利用科學(xué)、系統(tǒng)的激勵機制，成為當(dāng)前企業(yè)重要的發(fā)展目標(biāo)和迫切的要求。
二、課題研究的基本內(nèi)容、重點難點及要解決的主要問題
（一）基本內(nèi)容
1．對當(dāng)前我國的股權(quán)激勵機制的現(xiàn)狀進行分析。
2．企業(yè)在股權(quán)激勵機制運行時所遇到的問題進行研究。
3．針對企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵機制存在的問題提出相應(yīng)的措施。
（二）重點難點
1．分析股權(quán)激勵機制在我國企業(yè)運用管理中所存在的主要問題
2．企業(yè)如何有效地對股權(quán)激勵機制進行合理化管理提出一系列建議。
（三）要解決的主要問題及方法
1．現(xiàn)有資料和信息不足。
2．解決方法是積極到閱覽室、圖書館等有價值的位置查閱；學(xué)習(xí)研究，向指導(dǎo)老師請教。
3．結(jié)合自身企業(yè)的實際情況，分析企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵機制在企業(yè)管理中的重要性，逐漸完善課題。
三、寫作提綱
摘要
在激烈的市場競爭中，企業(yè)經(jīng)營者的激勵機制問題受到了人們的廣泛關(guān)注。長期以來，我國的中小企業(yè)存在著薪酬和績效嚴重脫節(jié)的情況，為了有效的解決這一矛盾，保障企業(yè)所有者的根本利益，為企業(yè)的發(fā)展提供動力和源泉，充分解決企業(yè)的瓶頸問題，是當(dāng)前企業(yè)需要迫切考慮的問題。股權(quán)激勵機制在我國的發(fā)展過程中，已經(jīng)成為了成熟的激勵機制，并且有不少國家已經(jīng)對股權(quán)激勵機制制度進行嘗試，通過該項制度的形成，促進了企業(yè)員工積極性的提高，進一步的推動了我國經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展。需要企業(yè)對該項制度進行全面的思考，以便能夠證明在企業(yè)實施中的可行性和有效性。
目錄
第一章 股權(quán)激勵機制概述
1.1股權(quán)激勵機制的概念
1.2股權(quán)激勵機制的實施對象
1.3股權(quán)激勵機制的類型
1.3.1實股激勵
1.3.2期股激勵
1.3.3期權(quán)激勵
第二章 股權(quán)激勵機制在我國企業(yè)中的運用
2.1我國企業(yè)產(chǎn)權(quán)的現(xiàn)狀
2.2股權(quán)激勵機制在我國企業(yè)中的實踐
2.2.1期權(quán)激勵的實踐
2.2.2管理層收購的實踐
第三章 影響股權(quán)激勵機制的因素
3.1公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善
3.2國家的行政行為影響了激勵機制
3.3證券市場的低效
3.4缺乏成熟的經(jīng)理人市場
3.5法律法規(guī)不完善給股權(quán)激勵的實施造成了障礙
第四章 對我國實施股權(quán)激勵機制的建議
4.1 完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)
4.2培養(yǎng)穩(wěn)定的資本市場
4.3建立健全的法律體系
4.4完善經(jīng)理人才市場
4.5完善外部監(jiān)督機制
結(jié)束語
企業(yè)員工是企業(yè)最活躍的因素，根據(jù)研究表明，在企業(yè)當(dāng)中運用一般的管理形式對個體的能力發(fā)揮只能達到20%-30%，而發(fā)揮充分的激勵機制就能發(fā)揮80%-90%，高級經(jīng)理人員的好壞決定了企業(yè)員工管理職能的成敗，好的管理人員具備良好的管理能力，并且成為當(dāng)前市場上稀缺的資源，成為企業(yè)經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的重要因素。股權(quán)激勵機制在企業(yè)中施行的過程，可以將企業(yè)員工的個人行為與企業(yè)效益建立在一起，為企業(yè)提供了緊密的聯(lián)系，可以促進企業(yè)的長遠發(fā)展，而不是將注意力集中在短期財務(wù)的基礎(chǔ)上，從而對傳統(tǒng)的薪酬制度進行實行行為短期化傾向，另一方面也使經(jīng)歷人員成為企業(yè)的所有者，解決了長期以來形成的“代理問題”。
通過對我國企業(yè)的發(fā)展歷程可以知道，我國的企業(yè)經(jīng)歷了從經(jīng)營責(zé)任制、承包制到現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的幾個重要階段。在這個過程中，為了調(diào)動企業(yè)員工和經(jīng)理人的積極性，先后采取了一系列的措施，在一定程度上激發(fā)了員工的積極性，但是由于激勵機制不足和經(jīng)營者短期行為的暴露，所以需要通過這種形勢來進行問題的解決。根據(jù)當(dāng)前的企業(yè)現(xiàn)狀來看，股權(quán)激勵機制是企業(yè)的長期激勵機制，在企業(yè)實行的過程中，可以降低企業(yè)代理的成本，激發(fā)經(jīng)營者的敬業(yè)精神，改變公司的管理機制，對人力資源的狀況進行改善，從而促進公司效益的提高和企業(yè)的長遠發(fā)展。
四、文獻綜述
美國律師凱爾索提出了兩要素理論，倡導(dǎo)建立資本主義所有權(quán)分散制度。讓所有人都可以既獲得勞動收入，又可以獲得資本收入。股權(quán)激勵機制在西方社會被廣泛使用，對于股權(quán)激勵機制所產(chǎn)生的重要影響，相關(guān)人員也進行研究。股權(quán)激勵水平和企業(yè)的業(yè)績存在著一定的關(guān)系，通過研究表明，公司的經(jīng)理人實行股權(quán)激勵后，會提升公司的工作效益，給員工的薪酬也會更多。經(jīng)歷持有的期權(quán)數(shù)額較多和促進企業(yè)效益的提高，股票的持有數(shù)與企業(yè)的業(yè)績之間存在著重要的聯(lián)系。
當(dāng)前，我國對股權(quán)激勵機制的研究還處于起步的階段，通過對我國實行股權(quán)激勵機制的企業(yè)進行深入的探討，分析了我國現(xiàn)階段的期權(quán)計劃困難問題，并且制定出了計劃方案的流程，對企業(yè)進行有效的實施。期權(quán)的激勵效應(yīng)是以企業(yè)的高效運轉(zhuǎn)為主要前提，給股價的操縱提供了更多發(fā)展的空間，公司的高管人員通過對股權(quán)激勵機制的激勵活動，實現(xiàn)了公司高管行為的短期化，推動了股價的升高。由于國內(nèi)的股權(quán)激勵機制研究的時間較晚，對于我國當(dāng)前不具備使用股權(quán)激勵機制的問題是不成立的，股權(quán)激勵在我國企業(yè)已經(jīng)運用了三十多年了，也有許多成功的案例，并且也一直為股權(quán)激勵的實行創(chuàng)造了很多條件。相信隨著股權(quán)激勵機制的不斷發(fā)展，一定會促進企業(yè)經(jīng)濟的快速增長。
五、本課題的進度安排
第1周—第2周（2015年12月08日---2015年12月22日）：
在老師指導(dǎo)下選擇參考書目，完成開題報告提綱。
第3周—第4周（2015年12月23日---2016年01月04日）：
修改論文開題報告
第4周—第7周（2016年01月05日---2016 年02月01日）：
完成論文初稿
第8周—第10周（2016 年02月02日---2016年02月25日）：
修改論文初稿
第10周—第11周（2016年02月26日---2016年3月10日）：
完成論文二稿并修改第二稿
第12周—第13周（2016年3月11日---2016年3月22日）：
完成論文三稿并修改第三稿
第14周—第15周（2016年3月23日---2016年4月08日）：
論文定稿并準備答辯相關(guān)資料
六、參考文獻
[1]盧雄鷹. 中國上市公司股權(quán)激勵問題研究[D].華東師范大學(xué),2013.
[2]李雪斌. 股權(quán)激勵機理研究[D].財政部財政科學(xué)研究所,2013.
[3]柴曼昕. A股上市公司高管股票期權(quán)激勵收入與價值創(chuàng)造關(guān)系研究[D].華南理工大學(xué),2013.
[4]王素娟. 基于企業(yè)成長的中國上市公司高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)研究[D].山東大學(xué),2014.
[5]黃玉龍. 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對高管薪酬契約實施效率影響的實證研究[D].中南大學(xué),2014.
[6]尹海霞. 中國上市公司股權(quán)激勵與資本結(jié)構(gòu)的關(guān)系研究[D].杭州電子科技大學(xué),2014.
[7]雒晗. 上市公司股權(quán)激勵計劃研究[D].西南財經(jīng)大學(xué),2014.
[8]李明. 我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵機制與公司績效關(guān)系的實證研究[D].南京航空航天大學(xué),2012.
[9]吳征宇. 股權(quán)激勵與上市公司價值相關(guān)性研究[D].西南財經(jīng)大學(xué),2012.
[10]鄢嫣. 股權(quán)激勵在我國房地產(chǎn)上市公司中的應(yīng)用問題研究[D].華東師范大學(xué),2011.
[11]Xiaoyan TENG,Yujing HE. Study of Effects of Equity Incentive in Gem Listed Company[J]. International Business and Management, 2014, 9 (2).
[12]Sarah Mcvay.Trading incentives to meet the analyst forecast[J].Review of Accounting Studies, 2006, 11 (4).
學(xué)生簽名：
2016 年 01 月04日
指導(dǎo)教師批閱意 見
該學(xué)生論文選題難度適中，與所學(xué)專業(yè)息息相關(guān)。參考文獻較為詳實，論文提綱與選題相符合，寫作進度安排合理。同意根據(jù)此開題報告開始撰寫論文初稿。
指導(dǎo)教師簽名：
2016年01月 06日
三江學(xué)院
畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文）外文資料翻譯
院 系 高職院
專 業(yè) 財務(wù)管理
學(xué)生姓名 單敏芳
班級學(xué)號 B125023053
外文出處 Economic Review
附件：1.外文資料翻譯譯文（約3000漢字）；
2.外文資料原文（與課題相關(guān)的1萬印刷符號左右）。
指導(dǎo)教師評語：
該生所選擇的外文資料與論文選題背景及意義吻合度較高，資料翻譯準確，邏輯性強，學(xué)習(xí)態(tài)度端正，具有一定查閱外文文獻和翻譯的能力。
指導(dǎo)教師簽名：
2016年 1月 11日
The corporate equity incentive's mechanism and application in our country
(Journal of Economics and Finance[J]. Jie Pan. 2006)
Abstract: With the increasing number of joint-stock enterprises, in order to improve the economic efficiency of enterprises, many enterprises to adopt the equity incentive approach to encourage enthusiasm of the staff work, the equity incentive for employee motivation is a very effective incentive mechanism, however, it not a panacea, how to understand the incentive, by what principle to motivate allowed to play a greater role in the theoretical study of the equity incentive and practical research, made a number of corporate equity incentive mechanism and application in the enterprise.
Keywords: enterprise; equity; incentive; mechanism
First, the principle of equity incentive
Take for different needs of different groups of incentives, in the initial stage of the material needs of the people most effective incentive, with the continuous improvement of people's needs, material incentives cannot play a major role, which requires more advanced incentives. In traditional management, we often give rise to a manager for corporate short-term profits at the expense of long-term interests of enterprises, mainly because of salary or bonus relationship with short-term interests of corporate managers more closely; managers are more concerned with business the short-term benefits. But as the company's shareholders, not just short-term corporate profits, are more concerned with long-term development of enterprises, especially for those growing businesses, managers should pay more attention to long-term interests of enterprises, rather than short-term profits. Incentive for this contradiction, equity is an effective method. Mainly through equity incentive to let managers participate in the survival and development of enterprises in the past, so that managers become part of the business, so that managers through some form of capital to participate in the enterprise to master certain equity companies, this equity incentive It allows managers to bring the development of enterprises to enjoy a variety of benefits, and the corresponding bear certain economic risks. Through this incentive approach allows managers during business decisions, more attention to the long-term interests of enterprises, better able to bring economic benefits for the development of enterprises.
Second, the impact factors of incentive stock options
Each effective incentive requires certain conditions and circumstances, and only under certain circumstances and conditions, incentives to be able to achieve the desired results, as equity incentive to achieve the intended purpose also requires certain conditions. Establish the effectiveness and equity incentive managers to improve the market has a very large relationship managers to make business decisions in favor of long-term development, not only depends on the manager of internal factors, but also need some external factors. Affected by a variety of mechanisms, managers make decisions are the results of internal and external factors interact. Equity incentive is part of a variety of external factors that can play a good role, there are many other factors, such as: market selection mechanism, market evaluation mechanisms, control and restraint mechanisms, incentives and integrated policy and legal environment provided by the Government.
(A) Market Evaluation Mechanism
Equity incentive need to have an objective evaluation of effective market system, the lack of reasonable fair and efficient market evaluation mechanisms, it cannot be an effective manager's performance assessment and prospects for effective forecasting. Under excessive government intervention, the development of market distortion and unfair audit, the regulation of the market is very limited and cannot be predicted by the stock's prospects for the development of enterprises, so it is difficult to motivate people through equity incentives for managers, not let managers make the right decisions, equity incentives will only lose its proper incentives.
(Ii) Market selection mechanism
Choice is an important means to arouse people's enthusiasm. Also there must be a rational human talent selection mechanism on the market, so as to protect the value of having a manager. Managers through executive orders and other non-market instruments to determine the long-term is difficult to be consistent with the interests of shareholders, which will lead to difficult to play the role of incentive stock options, meaning equity incentive would be gone. By the talent market selection mechanism, better pick out the manager's long-term interests of shareholders, the market mechanism may also not meet the conditions of the managers were eliminated, personnel selection mechanism in this market, managers can improve enthusiasm for work, make more informed decisions for the development of enterprises.
(C) control and restraint mechanisms
Control mechanism and with a reasonable incentive mechanism to be able to make incentives play a role, these control mechanisms are mainly bound to set limits for the manager's behavior, anti make outrageous decisions than managers. Managers’ person's control can allow enterprises to better development. For equity incentive and restraint mechanisms must meet the good, so that both the effective cooperation to be able to allow enterprises to better development.
(D) Comprehensive incentive mechanisms
An effective implementation of the incentive method requires some other appropriate supporting incentives, while equity incentive, but also with a number of other incentives, such as improving the working environment, to solve the difficult problem of their children to school, personal training opportunities for promotion, etc. Wait. With such a reasonable match to be able to make an equity incentive to play the role of its application, since the company is in the background, a different environment, so each company according to their actual situation with reasonable incentives.
(E) Environmental policy
Government service as a business person, it is not the producer of the product, it is a participant in the market, its main duty is to provide enterprises with relevant laws and regulations and management systems and other services, for the development of enterprises to create a fair and reasonable development environment.
Third, some problems exist in equity incentive
Equity incentives need to play a number of other conditions, with certain complexity, there will be some problems in the process of excitation by our country's corporate research and found the following problems in the equity incentives:
(A) "Internal" control exists
For listed companies really control are not always the shareholders, but the company's executives or managers who actually, which for the equity incentive planted some problems, most of our listed companies are state-owned enterprises from the transition from national accounting shares proportion higher. For some shareholders, the functions of the shareholders' meeting does not function effectively, shareholders cannot control a lot of the development of enterprises, and in this context the implementation of equity incentive, will often result in managers motivate managers themselves, such incentives cannot be function well, it will be abused by the company's management, which for the abuse of the right managers and decision-making cannot meet the long-term interests of the company laid a certain risk. For the internal control of the company's equity incentive not only not achieve the desired effect, the opposite will play a negative role, before the implementation of equity incentive, management will deliberately reduce the company's share price, we have to get more revenue, in the equity incentive after the addition, some companies that will suppress the release of benefits, and thus obtain greater benefits for some serious insider control of enterprises will take the cost of making a false report to conceal profits and costs in order to achieve the purpose of obtaining a huge return on equity. This action seriously damages the development of enterprises. So for the internal control of enterprises, equity incentives must be adjusted before we can get better as expected.
(Ii) capital market environment is not yet fully mature
Due to the late start of China's market economy, there are still some problems, which is the capital market environment is not a perfect performance. At present, China's capital market, a lack of authoritative information manufacturer for reflected in the market price of the stock is not real demand, often the result of other factors induce people focus too much on the stock price, not on business the benefits, while the indices for assessing enterprise organization is very small, such information cannot be effectively communicated to consumers, which resulted in the market price of the stock fluctuated, the capital market for the company's stock trading change became mainly speculative financial transactions in the capital market is not strong degree of effectiveness of the current situation, the implementation of corporate equity incentive system often cannot achieve the desired effect. The implementation of equity incentive system in our country, we need to further improve our capital market by the allocation to a market allocation policy, so that the share price reflects the real situation of enterprises, the only way to show the role of incentive stock options, in order to achieve the desired effect of incentive stock options.
Fourth, the countermeasures and suggestions
Perfection (a) Corporate Governance
Corporate governance structure for the company's development has a very important role, it is the role of the equity incentive an important prerequisite, while equity incentive is corporate governance is an important component. With the improvement of market-oriented incentives and international market competition, China's many state-owned enterprises should intensify reform, the establishment of modern enterprise system and improve the corporate governance structure, truly diversified ownership structure, through such reforms, allowing equity incentive role play better. For carrying out the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, we should strengthen the rights of the company's board of directors, dilute the "internal" control the situation, by improving the environment of the company, so that the role of equity incentive to get better play, let the company issued equity incentive in real play its due role.
(B) Establish the healthy development of advanced, regulated capital markets businesses.
A standardized and effective capital markets to establish and improve the play of equity incentives for having great significance, to establish a standardized capital market is conducive to transfer to the market a real capital needs information to make money on the capital market to obtain reasonable use, so that real-life role of capital to be more effective play. Establish a standardized, efficient capital market mechanism, improve the equity incentive allows better play. Establish a standardized capital market need to play an active and leading role in the government, accelerate the construction of the capital market, strengthen information disclosure, combating backroom deals and manipulative practices, strengthen supervision, to break the law should be strictly deal with. The company's stock price can truly reflect its business information and the operator's operating results.
(iii) Establish and improve relevant laws and regulations
At present, our business manager of the equity incentive mainly through the following channels to achieve, by issuing new shares and retained or recycling company stock to achieve, stimulate this equity has a very important question of law, internal company managers get shares in the capital market cannot be effective trading, which caused great losses to the manager's income, equity income managers in order to achieve often only be traded within the company, which gives insiders brought some interest, while the manager's return brought some losses, but this seems to be fair incentive to lose because of the laws and regulations fair, which need to establish and improve relevant laws and regulations, the real manager's income, so that incentive stock options the role of real play.
V. Summary
Equity play incentives need to have some basic conditions. Let the boot manager of equity incentive human behavior. For shareholders, the equity incentive must be taken in accordance with the actual situation of their company, understand the company's mode of operation, with a reasonable way to meet other incenti
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